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Abstract
I study a managed health service market where di¤erentiated providers compete for consumers
by choosing multiple service qualities, and where copayments that consumers pay and payments
that providers receive for services are set by a payer. The optimal regulation scheme is two-sided.
On the demand side, it justies and claries value-based reference pricing. On the supply side,
it prescribes pay for performance when consumers misperceive service benets or providers have
intrinsic quality incentives. The optimal bonuses are expressed in terms of demand elasticities,
service technology, and provider characteristics. However, pay for performance may not outperform
prospective payment when consumers are rational and providers are prot maximizing, or when
one of the service qualities is not contractible.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a model of managed provider competition with the following characteristics.
Consumers obtain health services from competing providers. The copayments that consumers pay,
and the payments that providers receive for services, are set by a payer. Each provider chooses its
service qualities based on the payers payment formula and demand response. Consumers, in turn,
pick providers based on their service qualities and the copayment levels. Health service markets
that t the description range from the predominantly public system in the United Kingdom, to the
mostly private system in the United States.
An important characteristic of health service markets described above is the coexistence of
various imperfect incentives. First, providers face competition. But the competition is imperfect
due to factors such as distance and unsophisticated consumers. Second, providers may have intrinsic
incentives to supply quality services. But their private incentives prevent them from acting as
perfect agents for consumers. Third, payers choose both copayments and provider payments to
inuence demand and supply. However, risk-spreading and other concerns often constrain consumer
cost shares to be signicantly below service costs. On the other hand, provider payment systems
are often based on quantity or imperfect quality measures. These multifaceted incentive problems
are further complicated by the heterogeneity of provider productivity, and the multidimensionality
of health service qualities that range from clinical process, treatment outcome, patient experience,
to safety.
A large literature, reviewed below, studies these incentive problems in a piecemeal manner.
The goal of this paper, however, is to analyze the interactions among these incentive issues in a
unied model. To model imperfect competition, I consider two providers with di¤erent production
costs located at the endpoints of a Hotelling line. They compete for consumers by o¤ering services
with two endogenous quality dimensions. Consumers have horizontal preferences, and they may
overreact or underreact to qualities because of misperceptions. On the other hand, providers can
receive non-pecuniary quality benets, and they may face prot-distribution constraints as not-
for-prot organizations. I allow the payer to set a copayment rate for each providers service, and
consider two provider payment mechanisms. Under prospective payment system, the payer pays a
xed price for each consumer that a provider serves. Under pay for performance, the payer also
pays bonuses according to service qualities. However, the payer may not measure one of the two
quality dimensions.
I focus on how the payer should coordinate its incentive instruments with market force and
providers intrinsic quality incentives. The payers goal is to achieve the social optimum, which
is dened by provider-specic service quality levels and consumer allocation between providers.
The systematic approach reveals the conditions under which a suitable combination of imperfect
instruments is su¢ cient for implementing the optimal outcome. It also illustrates how each of
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the payers instruments must be designed as an integrated part of the incentive system. Many
properties of the optimal instruments are new to the insurance benet design, provider payment
mechanism, multi-tasking, and intrinsic motivation literature. I now overview the main results.
The design of insurance benet. In the optimal insurance literature where the supply side is
active, a consumer interacts with a given provider to determine treatment quantity, and consumer
cost share is used to inuence the quantity choice in order to achieve production e¢ ciency (Ellis
and McGuire, 1990; Ma and McGuire, 1997). But under imperfect provider competition, each
consumer picks a provider for service, and the resulting market shares determine the providers
marginal prots from quality investments. Therefore, consumer cost shares a¤ect both market
shares and qualities, which correspond to allocative and production e¢ ciencies, respectively.
I show that both types of e¢ ciencies require consumer cost-sharing to i) reect the incremental
marginal cost when consumers pick a more costly provider for service, and ii) steer misperceived
consumers from overvalued service, and to undervalued service. The rst requirement justies the
use of di¤erential copayments such as reference pricing and preferred provider network. Moreover,
the optimal copayments for using high-cost providers can be below marginal costs and the optimal
copayments for using low-cost providers can be as low as zero. The second requirement supports
the use of value-based benet design. However, it claries that value-based copayment should be
based on misperceived service value rather than value itself.1, 2
The design and limitation of prospective payment system. On the supply side of health care
markets, prospective payment is one of the most common payment mechanisms. A dening charac-
teristic of prospective payment is that it pays a provider irrespective of its service cost and quality
levels. It is also well understood that if providers are local monopolies with exogenous quality, pro-
duction e¢ ciency can be achieved by paying each provider the average cost of comparable providers
(Shleifer, 1985). My model allows me to derive the optimal prospective prices when providers com-
pete by choosing qualities. I show that the optimal price of a providers service depends not only
on its competitors marginal cost, but also on the quality di¤erence at the social optimum (which
is xed) and the intensity of competition. This implies, for example, that the cost-based U.S.
Medicare Prospective Payment mechanism systematically underpays high-quality hospitals, and
overpays hospitals in more competitive markets.
1For example, the California Public EmployeesRetirement System adopted reference pricing in 2011
(White and Eguchi, 2014). In 2016, 48% of employees who were covered by employer-provided health
insurance in the U.S. were enrolled in preferred provider networks (Kaiser, 2016). Thomson et al. (2013)
review the international experience of value-based insurance designs.
2Baicker et al. (2015) characterize the optimal copayment for insurees who can make mistakes in a model
where the supply side is passive. They focus on the interactions of ex post moral hazard and consumer
mistakes (or behavioral hazard), whereas this paper focuses on the interactions of consumers, providers, and
payer.
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I also nd that prospective payment can achieve the social optimum only under some restrictive
conditions such as perfect consumer rationality. In particular, when providers compete by choosing
multiple qualities, any degree of consumer misperceptions can distort a provider away from the
optimal quality mix, and render the social optimum not attainable by any prospective prices.
The design of pay for performance, with and without unmeasurable quality. In recent years, many
payers have adopted pay for performance to incentivize health service qualities. However, a review of
34 programs in 14 OECD countries show that performance pay has only generated mixed, modest
and short-lived improvements (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016). On the other hand, theoretical
works on pay for performance are almost exclusively grounded on single-agent set up, and hence,
they provide little guidance on the optimality of performance pay under imperfect competition.3 In
my model, I rst consider the design of performance pay when both service qualities are contractible.
I nd that the optimal bonus for each quality does depend on the interaction between quality
elasticity of demand and service technology. In particular, the optimal bonus rate for a low-
marginal-cost service (such as imaging service) is decreasing in demand elasticity, whereas the
optimal bonus rate for a high-marginal-cost service (such as surgery) is increasing in demand
elasticity.
I then let one of the two qualities be unmeasurable by the payer, which is one of the primary
arguments against using performance pay (see, for example, Holmstrom and Milgroms (1991)
analysis of multitasking). To x idea, let the two qualities be patient experience and treatment
outcome, and the latter be not contractible.4 I show that a quality bonus on patient experience
is optimal if and only if consumerspreference for treatment outcome is too strong. In particular,
substitutability between qualities, an important determinant of the suitability of performance pay
in bilateral models, is irrelevant here. Both sets of results, with and without the measurement
issue, illustrate the importance of market force in bonus design problems.
Intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. The economic literature has long recognized that intrin-
sic quality incentives, in the form of non-pecuniary quality benet and organizational prot-
distribution constraint, can act as remedies for weak explicit quality incentives (Hansmann, 1996;
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 2005). I instead focus on how payment systems
should adapt to providersintrinsic incentives in imperfect competitive markets where qualities are
multidimensional. Consistent with the literature, I nd that intrinsic incentives can reduce the
levels of prices and performance bonuses. However, intrinsic incentives also generate paternalis-
3See, for example, Eggleston (2005). The only two exceptions that I am aware of are Acemoglu et al.
(2008), who show that governments have comparative advantage over markets and rms in o¤ering low-
powered incentives; and Benabou and Tirole (2016), who consider the impact of labor market competition
on performance-pay structure.
4When the U.S. Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program was launched in 2012, it measured
patient experience (and clinical process and safety) but not treatment outcome (VanLare and Conway, 2012).
Outcome measure was introduced in 2013.
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tic quality preferences and induce providers to deviate from the optimal quality mix. Therefore,
the social optimum can be attained only if the payer uses pay for performance to counteract the
provider paternalism. In other words, intrinsic and extrinsic incentives are complements rather
than substitutes in a multi-quality incentive system.
Equity concern and provider payment. In the main model, the social optimum is based on
economic e¢ ciency. In an extension, I allow the payer to have a strong equity concern, so that
it seeks to implement uniform qualities and sets uniform copayments despite asymmetric provider
costs. I show that prospective payment fails to implement the payers targeted allocation as if
consumers are misperceived or providers are intrinsically motivated. However, the principles for
setting performance pay continue to apply after small adjustments are made to account for the
change in qualities.
1.1 Literature
In addition to the areas described above, this paper also contributes to the literature on managed
competition in healthcare (Enthoven, 1993). I use the Hotelling framework to model imperfect
competition. This is based on Ma and Burgess (1993). In their main extensive form, two symmetric
providers choose unidimensional qualities and then prices, and the providers maximize prots by
choosing socially ine¢ cient quality levels. However, a regulator can restore production e¢ ciency
by regulating prices and making lump-sum transfers. This framework has been adopted to study
many regulation and payment design problems in healthcare markets.
Brekke et al. (2006) allow two providers to choose both unidimensional qualities and locations
on the Hotelling line. They nd a necessary trade-o¤ between vertical quality and horizontal dif-
ferentiation when the regulator sets xed prices before the providers pick qualities and locations.
Bardey et al. (2012) show that this trade-o¤ can be mitigated by a mixed-payment scheme. My
paper abstracts from location choices, and focuses on providers that o¤er services with multidimen-
sional qualities.5 I characterize the conditions under which xed prospective prices are su¢ cient
for achieving the social optimum.
Wolinsky (1997) compares managed competition, where providers use unidimensional qualities
to compete under xed prices, to local monopolies, where the regulator eliminates competition by
dividing the market administratively. He allows providers to have di¤erent cost functions as in
this paper. He shows that under complete information, local monopolies can achieve the social
optimum but managed competition cannot. However, when the regulator is uninformed about the
cost functions, managed competition is more e¤ective in extracting information rents, and hence,
5I also abstract from entry, exit, and merger of providers. Katz (2013) shows that entry can lower market
quality. Brekke et al. (2017) show that hospital merger may increase or decrease market quality.
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the ranking of the two regimes is ambiguous.6 I show that managed competition can achieve the
social optimum when provider payments are separated from consumer cost shares.7
Using a di¤erential-game approach, Brekke et al. (2012a) study quality dynamics under man-
aged competition. They use information lag to provide a foundation for consumersquality misper-
ceptions, and characterize the dynamic price regulation that implements the optimal quality path.
Brekke et al. (2012b) consider competition between symmetric non-prot providers in a static
model. They show that when prices are regulated, prot-distribution constraints can only induce
very altruistic providers to raise quality. My model incorporates both consumer misperception and
provider intrinsic incentives. I show that they both favor pay for performance over prospective
payment system.
Other than the mixed e¤ects on qualities, the empirical literature also nds that some providers
respond to pay for performance strategically (see, for example, Gravelle et al., 2010; Mullen et al.,
2010). Eggleston (2005) shows that mixed payment can mitigate strategic response to performance
pay in a moral hazard framework. Wu et al. (forthcoming) add hidden provider productivity to
the framework. They characterize a menu of optimal screening contracts in which the supply-side
cost share and performance bonus are, respectively, decreasing and increasing in the providers
reported productivity. My paper incorporates demand response into the payers contract design
problem. In particular, I show that quality elasticity of demand is an important determinant of the
optimal bonus rate. Recently, Gaynor et al. (2016) and Moscelli et al. (2016) estimate the quality
elasticities of demands for heart surgery and hip replacement, respectively.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up a benchmark model and shows the
source of ine¢ ciency under unmanaged provider competition. Section 3 characterizes the optimal
copayments, prospective payment system, and pay for performance in the benchmark model. Sec-
tion 4 incorporates consumer misperceptions, provider intrinsic quality incentives, unmeasurable
quality, and alternative market structures into the benchmark model. Section 5 introduces equity
concern to both the benchmark and the expanded models. Section 6 draws some concluding re-
marks. Appendix A collects the proofs of all lemmas and propositions. Appendix B contains the
proofs of some auxiliary results.
6Beitia (2003) compares managed competition to a monopoly that serves the entire market. She shows
that information asymmetry distorts the less-e¢ cient rms market share downward. This distortion can
change the optimal market structure from managed competition to monopoly. See also McGuire and Riordan
(1995).
7Brekke et al. (2011) analyze reference pricing in a vertical di¤erentiation model where the supply side
is not active. They also show that reference pricing reduces both brand-name and generic drug prices in
Norway.
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2 Model
2.1 Asymmetric providers and di¤erentiated consumers
There are two providers, A and B, that supply health services to consumers. The service of provider
i, i = A;B, has two quality dimensions, qi and ri, both chosen by the provider. A consumers benet
from receiving service with qualities (qi; ri) is vqqi+vrri, where all parameters are strictly positive.8
In this and the next section, I assume that vqqi+ vrri is both the true and perceived benets from
qualities (qi; ri). I will relax this assumption in Section 4.
In addition to service benets, each consumer is also described by a proclivity parameter x
towards the two providers à la Hotelling. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the [0; 1] interval,
whereas providers A and B are located at points 0 and 1, respectively. A consumer at location
x incurs a cost x to use provider A, and a cost (1   x) to use provider B. The parameter x
captures all horizontal di¤erentiation factors, such as travel distances and auxiliary services, that
a¤ect consumer payo¤s. Consumers have di¤erent proclivities towards these factors, and  captures
the relative importance of x in consumer choices.
Every consumer has to pay a nonnegative and identical cost share i to use provider i. I
will expand on the determinations of consumer cost shares in Subsections 2.3 and 3.1. When using
providers A and B, consumer xs payo¤s are vqqA+vrrA A x and vqqB+vrrB B (1 x),
respectively. The demand for provider is service is Di. Except in Subsection 4.4, I will maintain
the assumption that each consumer obtains service from one of the providers, so that the market
is covered, and hence, DA +DB = 1.
The total cost of provider i is determined by a provider-specic, twice-di¤erentiable function
Ci(Di; qi; ri). The total cost is strictly increasing in demand and each quality (CiD > 0, C
i
q > 0,
Cir > 0), strictly positive, and strictly convex in qualities. In this and the next section, providers
can be interpreted as healthcare professionals such as physicians or institutions such as hospitals,
and the objective of each provider is to maximize its own prot. I will introduce motivation benets
and prot-distribution constraints in Section 4.
2.2 First best
I let social welfare be the sum of consumer payo¤s less the sum of production costs. In the rst
best, a social planner chooses each providers market share Di and qualities (qi; ri) to maximize
social welfare. I take the duopoly market structure as given and assume that both providers are
8All the results in this paper continue to hold if consumer benet is V (qi; ri), where V is twice di¤eren-
tiable, strictly increasing, and concave.
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active. The social welfare isZ DA
0

vqq
A + vrr
A   x dx CA(DA; qA; rA)+Z 1
1 DA

vqq
B + vrr
B   (1  x) dx CB(DB ; qB ; rB): (1)
The following lemma characterizes the rst best.
Lemma 1 The rst-best market share Di and qualities qi, ri of provider i, i = A;B, j 6= i satisfy
the following:
1
2
+
"
vq(q
i   qj) + vr(ri   rj)  fCiD(Di; qi; ri)  CjD(Dj; qj; rj)g
2
#
= Di (2)
Divq = C
i
q(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
) (3)
Divr = C
i
r(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
): (4)
Expression (2), the rst-best market share of provider i, ensures that the optimal marginal
consumer at x = DA receives the same marginal social welfare from either provider. When the
two providers are symmetric, DA must be 1=2. Hence, the squared-bracket term in (2) summarizes
the e¤ect of service-cost asymmetry on the rst-best consumer allocation. The next two equations
show that raising a providers quality increases its consumerspayo¤s, but also the service cost.
The rst-best qualities of each provider i balance these marginal e¤ects.9
2.3 Unmanaged provider competition
Before I study managed competition, I rst consider an unmanaged health service market in which
consumers are covered by an indemnity plan. The payer sets a uniformed coinsurance rate ,
0 <   1. Each provider i then chooses price and qualities simultaneously to maximize its prot.
I use Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. The maximization program of provider i is
max
i;qi;ri

1
2
+
vq(q
i   qj) + vr(ri   rj)  fi   jg
2

i


  Ci(Di; qi; ri); (5)
where the squared-bracket term is provider is market demand Di, and where i= is provider is
per-unit revenue when it sets consumerscoinsurance payment to i.10 If the Nash equilibrium out-
come coincides with the rst best, managing provider competition cannot improve social welfare. A
welfare-maximizing payers role is conned to choosing a coinsurance rate, and lump-sum transfers
9It is not possible to pin down the comparative statics of  in the rst best without additional assumptions
on the models primitives. See Appendix B.
10In Appendix B, I provide su¢ cient conditions for (5) to be quasi-concave and each provider is best
response to be a contraction map. These conditions guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in the unmanaged market game.
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to and from consumers and providers. However, the following lemma, which extends Proposition
1 in Wolinsky (1997, p.827) to my environment, shows that unmanaged provider competition is
unlikely to achieve the rst best.
Lemma 2 Under unmanaged provider competition where provider is maximization program is
given by (5), the Nash equilibrium (iy; q
i
y; r
i
y) can achieve the rst best (D
i; qi; ri) only if Di = 1=2
and  = 1.
In equilibrium, provider i sets its consumers coinsurance payment equal to iy = 2D
i
y +
CiD(D
i
y; q
i
y; r
i
y), and receives 
i
y= = 2D
i
y= + C
i
D(D
i
y; q
i
y; r
i
y) from serving a consumer. Because
CiD(D
i
y; q
i
y; r
i
y) is the cost of serving the marginal consumer, 2D
i
y= can be interpreted as the
(marginal) markup. Substituting iy into the other rst-order conditions (in Appendix A) yields
the equilibrium values of Diy, q
i
y, r
i
y, which are characterized by
1
2
+
"
vq(q
i
y   qjy) + vr(riy   rjy)  fCiD(Diy; qiy; riy)  CjD(Djy ; qjy ; rjy)g
6
#
= Diy (6)
Diyvq = C
i
q(D
i
y; q
i
y; r
i
y) (7)
Diyvr = C
i
r(D
i
y; q
i
y; r
i
y): (8)
The di¤erences between these equations and those in Lemma 1 illustrate the source ine¢ ciencies
under unmanaged provider competition.
In the rst best, the social planner fully internalizes the social costs of consumer allocation and
qualities. However, consumer choices under unmanaged competition are driven by the di¤erence
in coinsurance payments, iy   jy. Therefore, consumers are less responsive to di¤erence in costs.
This, in turn, induces providers to over invest in qualities to attract consumers. These e¤ects
are captured by the parameter  in conditions (6) to (8). Moreover, providers under unmanaged
imperfect competition use their market power to price their services above marginal costs. The
makeups 2Diy= further distort market shares and qualities by turning 2 in (2) into 6 in (6).
11
The quality distortions due to coinsurance rate below one are consistent with the general equi-
librium e¤ects of the introduction of Medicare in 1965 (Finkelstein, 2007). Moreover, Cooper et
al. (2015) show that prices in the U.S. private hospital markets are positively associated with
hospital market power. In fact, the ine¢ ciencies identied in Lemma 2 generally arise, unless the
two providers are symmetric and the coinsurance rate  is set equal to one. These two assumptions
are frequently made in the imperfect competition literature. However, symmetry eliminates the
squared-bracket term in (6) and generates allocation e¢ ciency trivially. Moreover, (7) and (8) show
that when the coinsurance rate is one, the providersoverinvestment incentives are muted.
11The source of distortion here is di¤erent from the one in Spence (1975) because the marginal consumers
quality valuation is representative when consumers and rms are horizontally di¤erentiated.
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Starting with the next section, I consider managed competition where the payer actively chooses
prices. I will maintain the assumption that the providers are asymmetric.
3 Managed competition
I allow the payer to separately set cost shares that consumers pay, and payments that providers
receive for services. I continue to use i to denote the cost share that a consumer pays to use
provider is service. But from now on, I interpret i as the copayment for provider is service. I
use the accounting convention that consumer cost share i is received by the payer rather than the
provider.
I consider two provider payment mechanisms. Under Prospective Payment System (PPS), the
payer pays a xed price 	i to provider i for each unit of service provided, irrespective of the service
qualities. Under Pay for Performance (P4P), the payer pays a base price i, together with a
bonus to provider i for each unit of service provided. In this section, I assume that both quality
dimensions are contractible. When the qualities of provider is services are qi, ri, the bonus per
unit of service is iqi + iri, where i and i are the bonus rates chosen by the payer.12 The
contractibility assumption will be relaxed in Subsection 4.3. I allow the payer to make a lump-sum
transfer  i to provider i under both regimes.
The payer assigns equal weight to consumerspayo¤s and its own payo¤, but a lower weight to
the providersprots.13 Therefore, its objective is to implement the rst best dened in Lemma 1
at the lowest cost. In the extensive form game, the payer sets the copayments and provider payment
mechanism in Stage 1.14 The providers then choose qualities non-cooperatively and simultaneously
in Stage 2. The rst best is implemented if it is the sub-game prefect Nash equilibrium outcome.15
12For simplicity, I restrict attention to bonuses that are linear in qualities throughout this paper. This
approach is in line with a number of theoretical studies on pay for performance in healthcare. See, for
example, Eggleston (2005), Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011), and Sherry (2016). In practice, both the U.K.
National Health Service and the U.S. Medicare reward providers according to the number of points the
providers have earned in various quality domains.
13The assumption that the payer assigns a lower weight to the providersprots is standard. See, for
example, Baron and Myerson (1982). The assumption that the payer assigns an equal weight to consumers
payo¤s and its own payo¤ is made to ease notation. Introducing social cost of public fund does not increase
the number of margins in the rst best, and hence, will not alter implementation results in the following
analysis.
14This determines a proper subgame in the continuation game.
15In Appendix B, I provide su¢ cient conditions to guarantee that a subgame in Stage 2 has a unique
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
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The next subsection derives the optimal copayments. Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 characterize the
complementary optimal provider payment mechanisms.
3.1 Optimal Copayments
To implement the rst best, the payer has to induce providers to choose the rst-best qualities, and
induce consumers to follow the rst-best allocation. I study the implementation problem in two
steps. In the rst step, I let each provider i choose the rst-best qualities and derive the optimal
copayments that achieve the rst-best consumer allocation.
Lemma 3 Under managed competition, the rst best is implementable only if the copayments sat-
isfy
i   j = CiD(Di; qi; ri)  CjD(Dj; qj; rj): (9)
Recall that under unmanaged competition, the rst best can be achieved only if the coinsurance
rate is one, so that consumers incur the full service costs. Lemma 3, on the other hand, shows
that it is possible to implement the rst best without making consumers bear the full costs. In
particular, the lemma shows that e¢ cient consumer allocation can be achieved as long as the
di¤erence in copayments, i   j, are set equal to the di¤erence in the rst-best marginal service
costs, which the social planner uses to determine the rst-best consumer allocation in Lemma 1.16
This is because consumer choices in a covered market are driven by the price di¤erential rather
than the absolute prices. This gives the payer one degree of freedom in setting copayments under
managed competition.
The degree of freedom for e¢ ciency concern, together with risk-spreading concern (that is not
explicitly modeled), support the use of reference pricing in health insurance design. Under refer-
encing pricing policies, consumers pay a lower copayment for using lower-cost drugs or providers.
Condition (9) shows that the e¢ cient copayment for the low-marginal-cost provider can be as low
as zero. Moreover, the e¢ cient incremental copayment for the high-marginal-cost provider should
be set equal to the incremental marginal service cost, rather than the incremental average cost. The
same principle shows that in order for Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) to achieve allocative
e¢ ciency, the di¤erence between the in-network and out-of-network cost shares should reect the
di¤erence in marginal costs. Finally, the consumer quality benets are excluded in the e¢ cient
copayments in (9) because consumers have taken benets into account when they choose providers
for services.
16In this paper, I will focus on optimal compayments for simplicity. However, any optimal consumer cost
share policy that implements the rst best has to satisfy (9) in equilibrium. For the optimal design of a¢ ne
linear consumer cost shares that consist of copayment and coinsurance rates under imperfect competition,
see Bardey et al. (2016).
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3.2 Optimal Prospective Payment System
In addition to copayments, the payer also sets prospective prices	i in Stage 1 under PPS. The payer
implements the rst best if given the copayments and prospective prices, the rst-best qualities are
the equilibrium choices of each provider i, whose maximization program in Stage 2 is
max
qi;ri
"
1
2
+
vq(q
i   qj) + vr(ri   rj)  fi   jg
2
#
	i   Ci(Di; qi; ri) +  i; (10)
where  i is a lump-sum transfer.
Proposition 1 Suppose provider is maximization program is given by (10) and i satises Lemma
3. Under Prospective Payment System, the payer implements the rst best by choosing
	i = 2D
i
 + C
i
D(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
) =  + [vq(q
i
   qj) + vr(ri   rj)] + CjD(Dj; qj; rj): (11)
Moreover,  i can be chosen such that provider is equilibrium prot is zero.
The Proposition says that by using two prospective prices and one cost share di¤erential, the
payer can implement the rst best allocation dened in Lemma 1, which comprises ve choice
variables.17 And that two more lump-sum payments are needed for prot extractions. The last
subsection has characterized the optimal copayments. Now consider provider is quality choice
problem in (10). For each quality dimension k, k = q; r, the marginal social benet and marginal
gross prot of provider is service are, respectively,
Di  vk| {z }
market share  marginal benet
and vk=2  [	i   CiD(Di; qi; ri)]| {z } :
marginal market share  markup
Observe that the marginal benet vk in both terms can be cancelled out to make the residual
di¤erence independent of quality k. The independence makes it feasible to equalize the two terms
by a single prospective price. Hence, the payer can use (11) to induce each prot-maximizing
provider to choose two qualities optimally. In fact, the value of 	i is the same as the price that
each provider i chooses under unmanaged competition when the coinsurance rate in Subsection 2.3
is equate to one. However, the prospective price is now separated from the copayments, and hence,
they have no direct impacts on consumer choices.
The expression for 	i on the right-hand side of (11) does not depend on each provider is own
marginal service cost. This is because any increase in CiD(D
i; qi; ri) is o¤set by a proportional
17Introducing cost reduction choices à la Ma (1994) and Hart et al. (1997) into the model does not a¤ect
the rst-best implementation result. See Appendix B for the details.
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decrease in the optimal markup 2Di (see the denition of Di in (2)).18 Hence, 	i is based
on the marginal service cost of provider j only, and may rst appear to resemble the optimal
price in Shleifers (1985) yardstick competition model, the model that forms a theoretical basis of
prospective payment systems in use. However, there are important di¤erences between Shleifers
yardstick price and 	i. First, Shleifers providers are identical local monopolists supplying services
with exogenous, one-dimensional, and identical quality, whereas the providers here compete by
supplying endogenous and multiple qualities. The endogeneity accounts for the squared-bracket
term in (11), which rewards a provider if consumers value its services more, and vice versa. Second,
the  in (11) is a markup that a provider gets from consumershorizontal preferences, à la Hotelling.
Since  can be interpreted as a measure of market competitiveness, (11) states that the optimal
prospective prices are decreasing in the degree of provider competition.19
I will later show that PPS becomes less capable in more complicated environments. However,
Proposition 1 still provides some useful guidance on optimal payment design. In practice, the U.S.
Medicares inpatient prospective prices are based on the average service costs, and are adjusted
for factors such as local wage index and medical education (Krinsky et al., 2016). Proposition 1
identies three potential sources of ine¢ ciency in the current system. First, the system may overpay
services that have marginal costs lower than average costs, and vice versa (see Table 1 in the next
subsection for examples). Second, the system does not take quality di¤erences into account, so
it may overpay low-quality hospitals and underpay high-quality ones. Third, the system does not
adjust for service market competitiveness, so it may overpay hospitals in more competitive hospital
markets, and vice versa.
3.3 Optimal Pay for Performance
Under P4P, the payer chooses base price i, and bonus rates i, 
i
 in addition to copayment for
each provider i. The maximization program of provider i is
max
qi;ri
"
1
2
+
vq(q
i   qj) + vr(ri   rj)  fi   jg
2
# 
i + 
i
q
i + ir
i
  Ci(Di; qi; ri): (12)
The rst best is implemented if the rst-best qualities are the equilibrium choice of provider i.
18When the providers have symmetric cost structure so that the subscript can be suppressed, (11) becomes
	 =  +CD(1=2; q; r). The results below can be adjusted in the same way to accomodate symmetric cost
structure.
19Moreover, Shleifers yardstick prices are determined ex post by the unit costs chosen by shadow providers;
whereas the value of 	i is determined by the regulator ex ante, as in most of the managed healthcare markets
in practice. This suggests that managing imperfect quality competition is informationally more demanding
than regulating local monopolies.
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Proposition 2 Suppose provider is maximization program is given by (12) and copayments satisfy
Lemma 3. Under Pay for Performance, the payer implements the rst best by choosing i and 
i

such that
iq
i
 = vqq
i
   "iq

Ci(Di; qi; ri)
Di
  CiD(Di; qi; ri)

(13)
ir
i
 = vrr
i
   "ir

Ci(Di; qi; ri)
Di
  CiD(Di; qi; ri)

(14)
where "ik =
vk
2
ki
Di
is provider is quality elasticity of demand at ki, k = q; r, and i is chosen
such that provider is equilibrium prot is zero.
It is of course not surprising that the rst best can be implemented by contracting on qualities.
However, Proposition 2 will serve as a benchmark in the analysis that follows. The construction
of optimal bonuses in the proposition also deserves attention. Consider (13). The bonus rate
i a¤ects provider is incentive to increase qi through two channels. First, the bonus rate is
the marginal revenue that provider i obtains from raising the quality. First-best implementation
requires marginal private benet to be aligned with marginal social benet. This accounts for the
term vqqi in (13).
However, provider is marginal private benet of choosing qi is di¤erent from vqqi. This is due
to the second channel, demand response, which accounts for the term "iq fg in (13). When the
bonus induces provider i to raise quality, the provider attracts more consumers from its competitor.
The demand responsiveness is captured by "iq, the quality elasticity of demand. For each additional
consumer, provider is incremental revenue is i + iqi + 
i
ri. In order to extract all prots from
provider i, the payer sets the base price i such that the incremental revenue equals the average
service cost Ci(Di; qi; ri; )=Di. However, provider is marginal service cost is CiD(D
i; qi; ri). If
the marginal cost is below the average cost, the provider enjoys a positive markup, and hence, it
has excessive incentives to attract consumers by raising quality qi. Therefore, the term "iq fg is
subtracted from vqqi in (13) to implement the rst best. The reverse is true when the marginal
cost is above the average cost, so that the markup is negative. The value of iri in (14) can be
interpreted in the same way.
Technology Example Optimal bonus rate
Marginal cost < Average cost Imaging service
Lower than marginal social benet
and decreasing in demand elasticity
Marginal cost = Average cost Drug therapy
The same as marginal social benet
and independent of demand elasticity
Marginal cost > Average cost Surgery
Higher than marginal social benet
and increasing in demand elasticity
Table 1: Optimal bonus rate
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Under PPS, the optimal prospective prices are always increasing in market competitiveness
(or decreasing in ). However, conditions (13) and (14) show that the optimal bonus rates can
be increasing or decreasing in demand response, which is proportional to market competitiveness.
Table 1 illustrates how the relationship between bonus rate and demand response is determined
by a services cost structure. For example, the optimal bonus rates for high-xed-cost imaging
service can be very close to zero when consumers are responsive to service qualities.20 The intricate
relationships in the table also provide a potential explanation for the mixed provider responses to
uniform bonus rates across services and markets in practice. Finally, the value of the optimal base
price i in the proposition is given by (42) in Appendix A. Because i is su¢ cient to implement
the rst best at zero prot, lump-sum transfer is not needed.
4 Consumer misperceptions, not-for-prot providers, non-contractible
quality, and alternative market structures
In this section, I relax the assumptions that consumers are perfectly rational and providers are
purely prot-maximizing. I rst consider implementation problems in which the payer has the
same instruments as in the last subsection. I will then relax the assumption that qualities are
perfectly contractible in Subsection 4.3. Finally, Subsection 4.4 will consider two alternative market
structures in which providers do not compete with each other.
4.1 Consumer misperceptions and prices
The analysis so far has assumed that vqqi + vrri is both the true and perceived service benets.
However, the medical literature has shown that patients can have wrong perceptions about providers
and services.21 I now incorporate consumer misperceptions into the model. I continue to let
vqq
i + vrr
i be a consumers true benet from provider is service. However, the same consumer
perceives that the benet from provider is service is eviqqi+evirri, where every evik, k = q; r, is positive
20Moreover, (13) and (14) show that the payer can ignore the cross e¤ects between qualities of the same
provider or competing provider. And this is true even if the quality benets are not additive separable in
the consumersbenet function.
21At the provider level, Doyle et al. (2013) show that the association between patient experience and
technical quality of care is mixed in the medical literature. However, there are more consistent associations
between patient experience and some other measures of clinical quality. At the service level, Schwartz et
al. (2014) nd that at least 25% of the U.S. Medicare beneciaries have received low-value services that
provide little to no clinical benets in 2009. This observation cannot be explained by ex post moral hazard
if consumers are perfectly rational.
14
and provider specic.22 The consumer overestimates the benet of provider is quality ki if evik > vk,
and underestimates the benet if vk > evik > 0.
The payer seeks to implement the rst best characterized in Lemma 1, which is based on
consumer true service benets. On the other hand, consumer choices are based on perceived
service benets.23 The payer chooses copayments to inuence consumer choices as in Subsection
3.1. The following lemma shows how the optimal copayments in Lemma 3 have to be adjusted to
accommodate consumer misperceptions.24
Lemma 4 Suppose consumerstrue and perceived benets from provider is service are vqqi+ vrri
and eviqqi + evirri, respectively. Under managed provider competition, the rst best is implementable
only if the payer sets
ei   ej = CiD(Di; qi; ri)  CjD(Dj; qj; rj) + hf(eviq vq)qi+(evir vr)rig   f(evjq vq)qj+(evjr vr)rjgi : (15)
The squared-bracket term in (15) complements the cost-based reference pricing rule by requiring
consumers to internalize the di¤erence between perceived and true quality benets. This forms
the basis of "value-based" insurance design when consumers misperceive the benets from using
di¤erent providers or services. For example, suppose consumers overestimate the benet of quality
q o¤ered by provider i, so that eviq > vq. Condition (15) says that the payer should raise the cost-
based copayment di¤erential in Lemma 3 by (eviq  vq)qi to discourage consumers from overutilizing
provider iservice. Now suppose consumers overestimate the benets of quality q o¤ered by both
providers, so that eviq = evjq = evq > vq. The squared-bracket term in (15) becomes (evq   vq)(qi   qj),
which is positive when qi > q
j
. In general, the copayment di¤erential in (15) can accommodate
multiple sources of consumer misperceptions so long as the market is covered.25 Thus, the payer
can retain the degree of freedom in setting copayments, as in Lemma 3.
22Again, all the results continue to hold if the perceived benet is eV i(qi; ri), where eV i is provider specic,
twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave.
23In the terminology of Kahneman et al. (1997), vqqi+vrri and eviqqi+evirri are the consumers"experience
utilities" and "decision utilities", respectively. Welfare is based on experience utilities but consumer choices
are based on decision utilities.
24The di¤erence between vqqi + vrri and eviqqi + evirri represents the (residual) misperceptions that cannot
be eliminated by information "nudge" (see, for example, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The mechanism design
approach I use here is consistent with the idea of optimal paternalism in ODonoghue and Rabin (2003). See
Farhi and Gabaix (2015) for an application of this approach to the design of optimal taxation.
25The rst best would not be implementable by a single price di¤erential if the misperceptions were het-
erogeneous among consumers. Armstrong (2015) shows that when there are both rational and misperceived
consumers in the same market, the misperceived consumers may cross-subsidize the rational consumers in
equilibrium.
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4.2 Providersnon-pecuniary benets and prot-distribution constraints
Other than perfectly rational consumers, the analysis in Section 3 has also assumed that providers
are purely prot-maximizing. However, many healthcare professionals enjoy non-pecuniary benets
from providing quality services. Moreover, many institutional providers are not-for-prot organiza-
tions. Equipped with Lemma 4, I now study the payers payment design problem when consumers
have quality misperceptions, and providers have intrinsic quality incentives.
From now on, I assume that provider i, either as an individual or an organizations executive,
receives non-pecuniary benet from providing services. These non-pecuniary benets can be broadly
dened to include genuine altruism and warm-glow benet such as social status and recognition.
When provider i serves a consumer at quality levels (qi; ri), the non-pecuniary benet is iqq
i+irr
i,
where iq and 
i
r are provider specic and strictly positive.
26 I assume that the non-pecuniary
benets cannot be monetized or extracted. Moreover, the non-pecuniary benets do not enter the
social welfare function, so Lemma 1 continues to characterize the rst best.27 I also allow provider
i to be a not-for-prot organization. I follow Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) to model non-prot status
as a constraint on prot distribution. The constraint forces a non-prot organizations executives
to spend prots on perquisites, which are less valuable than cash. Therefore, when provider i is a
not-for-prot organization and its prot is i, the executivestotal payo¤ from perquisites is only
ii, where 1 > i > 0. However, I will relax the range of i to 1  i > 0 in the following analysis
in order to consider both for-prot and not-for-prot providers who enjoy non-pecuniary benets.28
Under PPS, the non-pecuniary benet and non-distribution constraint, together with consumer
misperceptions, modify provider is maximization program (10) in Subsection 3.2 to
max
qi;ri
"
1
2
+
feviqqi+evirrig+ fevjqqj+evjrrjg   fei ejg
2
# h
fiqqi + irrig+ ie	ii  iCi( eDi; qi; ri) + ie i; (16)
where the rst squared-bracket term is the denition of provider is market demand eDi when
consumers are misperceived. These modications signicantly limit the capability of PPS, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 3 Suppose provider is maximization program is given by (16) and ei satises Lemma
26The non-pecuniary benet can be generalized to i(qi; ri), where i is twice di¤erentiable, strictly in-
creasing, and concave, without changing the results.
27I exclude the rmsnon-pecuniary benets from social welfare to avoid the problem of double counting,
see, for example, Hammond (1987) and Milgrom (1993). Moreover, I assume that perquisites have no social
benet.
28In Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), the entrepreneur su¤ers a non-pecuniary cost of quality shirking, no
matter that the rm is for-prot or not-for-prot.
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4. Under Prospective Payment System, the payer can implement the rst best only if
vq   iq=i
vr   ir=i
=
eviqevir : (17)
When (17) holds, the rst best can be implemented by
e	i =
"
2Di

vr   ir=ievir

  
i
qq
i + irri
i
#
+ CiD(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
; ) (18)
and e i can be chosen such that provider is equilibrium prot is zero.
While PPS implements the rst best unconditionally in Subsection 3.2, it implements the rst
best here only if (17), a knife-edge condition, holds. On the left-hand side of (17) is the consumer
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) required for provider i to choose the rst-best quality mix
under PPS. When provider i is prot-maximizing, the ratio is simply vq=vr. However, both the
non-pecuniary benet and non-distribution constraint incentivize the provider to raise qualities.
Therefore, the required demand response of quality ki is reduced by the level of ik=
i, which
adjusts the required MRS to the ratio in (17). On the right-hand side of (17) is the actual MRS.
For perfectly rational consumers, the ratio is again vq=vr, but consumer misperceptions change it toeviq=evir. Because of the changes on both sides of (17), the rst best is generically not implementable
when providers have intrinsic quality incentives and/or consumers are misperceived.
For the sake of completeness and future reference, consider the optimal prospective price e	i
when (17) holds. This is (18) in the proposition. Recall that in Subsection 3.2, the markup in the
prospective price is 2Di. That markup is adjusted to the squared-bracket term in (18), which is
decreasing in provider is non-pecuniary benet, and cost of non-distribution constraint (due to a
smaller i).29 The markup is also decreasing in consumersmisperceived quality benet.
Now turn to P4P. Provider is preference and constraint, together with consumer misperceptions
turn maximization program (12) in Subsection 3.3 to
max
qi;ri
"
1
2
+
feviqqi+evirrig   fevjqqj+evjrrjg   fei ejg
2
# h
fiqqi+irrig+ i
nei+eiqi+eirioi  iCi( eDi; qi; ri):
(19)
However, the optimal bonuses can be adjusted to accommodate these new elements.
Proposition 4 Suppose provider is maximization program is given by (19) and ei satises Lemma
4. Under Pay for Performance, the payer implements the rst best by choosing ei and ei such that
eiqi =
"
vq  
iq
i
#
qi   e"iq
(
Ci(Di; q
i
; r
i
)
Di
 
"
CiD(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
) 
iqq
i
 + 
i
rr
i

i
#)
(20)
eiri = vr   ir
i

ri   e"ir
(
Ci(Di; q
i
; r
i
)
Di
 
"
CiD(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
) 
iqq
i
 + 
i
rr
i

i
#)
(21)
29Using the denition of Di, it can be shown that e	i is generically not independent of CiD(Di; qi; ri).
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where e"ik = evik2 kiDi is provider is quality elasticity of demand at ki, k = q; r. Moreover, ei is
chosen such that provider is equilibrium prot is zero.
Consider the comparison between (20) and (13). The changes in consumer response and provider
objective introduce three adjustments to the optimal bonuses. First, because consumers are inu-
enced by their misperceptions, the demand elasticity in (20) is updated to e"iq . Second, both
Provider is (marginal) non-pecuniary benet and non-distribution constraint act as direct sub-
stitutes of explicit quality incentive. This accounts for the rst squared-bracket term in (20).
Finally, the (total) non-pecuniary benet and non-distribution constraint also induce provider i to
expand its market share, as if it has a lower marginal service cost. This accounts for the second
squared-bracket term in (20). The optimal ei in (21) is adjusted in the same way.30
Both the optimal prospective price in Proposition 3 and the optimal bonuses in Proposition
4 show that consumer misperception is a key determinant of optimal provider payments (whereas
the optimal copayments do not depend on providers objectives). The payment formulae also
conrm that providersnon-pecuniary benets can reduce the magnitude of monetary incentives
(Besley and Ghatak, 2005), and that non-distribution constraint can incentivize quality provision
(Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). Indeed, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and a
large follow-up literature have used single-quality models to argue that non-pecuniary benet and
non-distribution constraint are substitutes of explicit incentives.
The primary implication of Propositions 3 and 4, however, is that when service quality is multi-
dimensional, explicit incentives are complements of non-pecuniary benet and non-distribution con-
straint. In particular, (17) shows that under PPS both non-pecuniary benet and non-distribution
constraint distort a providers marginal private quality benet away from the marginal social qual-
ity benet. This provider paternalism can be corrected by targeted quality bonuses but not generic
prices. This suggests that in health service markets, where providers generally possess intrinsic
quality incentives, P4P has a less signicant role in incentivizing qualities, but a more signicant
role in directing resource allocation.
4.3 Non-contractible quality
Until now the two qualities are contractible, and P4P can always perform weakly better than
PPS. I now relax the perfect contractibility assumption. I follow Benabou and Tirole (2016) to
assume that one of the two qualities, quality r, is not contractible, because the quality is not
observable/measurable by the payer. Other settings are the same as the previous two subsections.
30The values of ei and ei in the proposition can be negative. Suppose that the regulator is conned to
set positive bonus rates, and that ei < 0. Proposition 5 in the next subsection shows that the payer can
still implement the rst best if a su¢ cient condition holds.
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In particular, consumers continue to observe the two qualities of each provider, but their perceptions
about service benets can be wrong.31
Consider PPS. Here, provider i receives a xed price per unit of service, irrespective of the levels
of qi and ri. Therefore, the non-contractability of ri has no impact on the implementability of the
rst best and the optimal prospective prices. I state this obvious result as a corollary.
Corollary 1 Proposition 3 remains valid when quality r is non-contractible.
How about P4P? When ri is not contractible, the payer can only use base price and bonus ratebi to incentivize provider i. If the payer can also make a lump-sum transfer to provider i, the
providers maximization program becomes
max
qi;ri
"
1
2
+
feviqqi+evirrig   fevjqqj+evjrrjg+ fei ejg
2
# h
fiqqi+irrig+ i
nbi+biqioi  iCi( eDi; qi; ri)+ ib i:
(22)
It turns out that these instruments can also implement the rst best at zero prot if a su¢ cient
condition holds.
Proposition 5 Suppose provider is maximization program is given by (22) and ei satises Lemma
4. Furthermore, suppose that the left-hand side of (17) is larger than its right-hand side. Under
Pay for Performance, the payer implements the rst best by choosing bi and bi such that bi =e	i   biqi, where e	i is given by (18) in Proposition 3 and where
bi =
"
vq  
iq
i
#
  eviqevir

vr   
i
r
i

(23)
is strictly positive. Moreover, b i can be chosen such that provider is equilibrium prot is zero.
In Proposition 4, where both qualities are contractible, each of the two bonus rates is set so
that provider is marginal private benet from each quality is the same as the marginal social
benet at the rst best. But bi cannot be set in that way when r is non-contractible. In fact, this
multi-tasking problem has been studied extensively in the bilateral setting. In this literature, the
optimality of rewarding the contractible qualities depends on whether the contractible and non-
contractible qualities are substitutes and complements in the principals benet function, and the
agents production function (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Kaarboe and Siciliani, 2011; Sherry,
2016). However, Proposition 5 shows that these relationships are inconsequential here.32 This is
31If quality r is observable by the payer but not the consumers, the payer can inform the consumers by
reporting the quality publicly. Consumer imperfect inferences from the report can be captured by evir.
32This is true even if consumers true and perceived benets are V (qi; ri) and eV i(qi; ri). This is because
Proposition 5 is based on rst derivatives (marginal bents) but not cross-partial derivatives. Whether the
two qualities are substutites or complements in consumption are inconsequential.
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because under managed competition, provider i is also responding to consumersquality preferences,
which are absent in the bilateral framework.
In order to understand how the value of bi in Proposition 5 is determined, consider Proposition
3 again. There, PPS fails to implement the rst best whenever (17) does not hold. Now let the
left-hand side of (17) to be larger than the right-hand side, so that consumerspreference for quality
q is weaker than what is required to implement the rst best under PPS. Fix provider is revenue
from a consumer at e	i in Proposition 3, and introduce the bonus rate bi in Proposition 5 to
the providers maximization problem. The bonus incentivizes the provider to raise quality qi, and
reduces the required demand response of qi by the level of bi. Hence, the required MRS on the
left-hand side of (17) becomes
vq   iq=i   bi
vr   ir=i
=
vq   iq=i   [(vq   iq=i)  (eviq=evir)(vr   ir=i)]
vr   ir=i
=
eviqevir ;
which is identical to the actual MRS on the right-hand side of (17). Therefore, the rst best becomes
implementable. The implementation still requires that the providers revenue from a consumer bee	i, but this can be accomplished by the optimal base price bi = e	i   biqi.
What if the left-hand side of (17) is smaller than the right-hand side? Here, consumerspref-
erence for quality q is stronger than what is required to implement the rst best under PPS. In
principle, the payer can use a negative bi that satises (23) to implement the rst best. How-
ever, quality penalty is practically infeasible to implement, whereas any positive bonus will distort
qualities further away from the rst best. Thus, PPS does perform better than P4P in this case.
These results suggest that under partial contractibility, the optimal choice between PPS and P4P
is determined by consumerspreferences over contractible and non-contractible qualities.33
4.4 Alternative market structures
In order to isolate the e¤ects of imperfect competition on copayment and provider payment design,
this subsection considers two closely related market structures where competition is suppressed.
In the rst scenario, the market share of provider i is exogenously xed at D
i
due to capacity
constraints or other restrictions.34 In the rst best, qualities qi and ri are still dened by (3) and
(4) after Di in those conditions are replaced by D
i
. However, without genuine consumer choices,
copayments become lump-sum transfers that do not a¤ect qualities. On the supply side, the variableeDi in the maximization programs in this section has to be replaced by the constant Di. Under
33In the setting of hip replacement surgery in the English National Health Service, Gutaker et al. (2016)
study the strength of patientspreferences over di¤erent quality measures.
34Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) is the rst paper to study optimal contracting without demand re-
sponse, where quality is unidimensional, and provider engages in cost-reduction activities.
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PPS, the rst best is implementable only if vq=vr = iq=
i
r, so that the payer and provider i share
the same preference over qualities. Under P4P with full contractibility, (20) and (21) continue to
characterize the bonus rates that implement the rst best unconditionally, after all e"ik in the two
conditions are set to zero, so that the e¤ects of competition and technology on bonus rates are
muted. When quality r is not contractible, P4P can implement the rst best only if vq=vr > iq=
i
r,
so that the payer prefers quality q more than provider i. Consumerspreference is inconsequential
on both sides of the market.
In the second scenario, only provider A is active and the Hotelling line is not covered. In
this monopoly model, consumers choose between provider As service and no service, which yields
zero payo¤. In Appendix B, I characterize the rst best in which the marginal consumer receives
zero (net) social welfare from provider As service. I then consider the rst-best implementation
problems. On the supply side, the formulae in Propositions 3 to 5 continue to pin down the
necessary conditions and optimal payments for implementation, once the demand responses and
the corresponding elasticities are adjusted to account for the change in market structure.35 On the
demand side, however, e¢ cient allocation requires consumers to incur the full marginal cost. This
shows that the referencing pricing rules in Lemmas 3 and 4 are optimal only when genuine provider
choices are available.
5 Equity concern
Now return to the managed competition paradigm. The previous sections have studied various
rst-best implementation problems. But in practice, rst-best implementation can be infeasible or
undesirable because the payer has concerns other than economic e¢ ciency. This section focuses
on equity concern. In particular, I let the payers new objective be implementing uniform service
qualities e¢ ciently. I also let the payer set uniform copayments for the two providers services.
However, I will show that the basic principles for optimal provider payment design apply well
beyond the rst best.
5.1 Second best
In the second best, consumers are perfectly rational and providers are purely prot maximizing as
in Section 3. Because there is no quality variation between providers, the market share of each
provider is 1=2, and the average transportation is =4. The social planner, who can dictate qualities,
35Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b) consider a similar model. They show that when the payer and con-
sumers have the same preference over qualites, the rst best can be implemented by a lump-sum transfer and
two provider prices, one for the consumers who are served, and one for the consumers who are not served.
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chooses uniform q and r to maximize social welfare
vqq + vrr   =4  CA(1=2; q; r)  CB(1=2; q; r):
The second-best qualities are characterized by
vq = C
A
q (1=2; qs; rs) + C
B
q (1=2; qs; rs) (24)
vr = C
A
r (1=2; qs; rs) + C
B
r (1=2; qs; rs): (25)
These conditions demonstrate how equity concern reduces production e¢ ciency. When the social
planner chooses uniform qualities, it has to balance the marginal social benet of each quality to
the marginal quality costs of both providers. Therefore, providers are generally not producing at
their e¢ cient quality levels, where the marginal benets equal the marginal costs of each provider.
Now turn to the implementation problems. Because equity concern dictates that the payer set
uniform copayments (which is optimal when consumers are rational), it is su¢ cient to revisit the
provider payment design problems. The next proposition considers PPS.
Proposition 6 Under Prospective Payment System, the second best is implementable only if
Ciq(1=2; qs; rs)
Cir(1=2; qs; rs)
=
vq
vr
: (26)
This condition and (17) in Proposition 3 have similar interpretation. In order for PPS to
implement either the rst best or the second best, the required MRS between qualities must be
equal to the actual MRS. For rst-best implementation, both ratios are vq=vr. However, the
payers equity concern distorts the second-best qualities from each providers e¢ cient levels. This
distortion introduces marginal quality costs to the required MRS without changing the actual MRS,
and renders the second-best qualities generically not implementable.
Proposition 6, together with Propositions 1 and 3, show that PPS can generically implement
the payers ideal allocation only when the payer is maximizing e¢ ciency, providers are maximiz-
ing prots, and consumers are perfectly rational. Distortion on any side makes implementation
infeasible. I next turn to P4P with both qualities contractible.
Proposition 7 Under Pay for Performance, the payer implements the second best by choosing is
and is such that
isqs =
Ciq(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
qs   "qs

Ci(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
  CiD(1=2; qs; rs)

(27)
isrs =
Cir(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
rs   "rs

Ci(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
  CiD(1=2; qs; rs)

(28)
where "ks =
vk
2
ks
1=2
is the common quality elasticity of demand at ks, k = q; r. Moreover, is is
chosen such that provider is equilibrium prot is zero.
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This result once again illustrates the vigor of P4P. For second-best implementation, the marginal
quality benet, vq, in (13) is replaced by the marginal quality cost (per consumer), Ciq(1=2; qs; rs)=(1=2),
in (27) to accommodate the distortion due to equity concern. This is the only change in the bonus-
rate formula. Therefore, the relationship among cost structure, demand elasticity, and bonus rate in
Table 1 remains valid. Indeed, the next proposition shows that when quality r is not contractible,
the payers equity concern also restricts the capability of P4P in a way similar to that due to
consumer-side and provider-side distortions.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the left-hand side of (26) is larger than its right-hand side. Under Pay
for Performance, the payer can implement the second best by choosing bis, bis, and b is optimally.
In particular,
bis =
"
Ciq(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
#
  vq
vr

Cir(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2

: (29)
When the left-hand side of (26) is larger than its right-hand side, the relative marginal cost of
qs over rs is too high for provider i to choose the second-best quality mix under PPS. Here, the
bonus rate in (29) is again chosen to adjust the required MRS, so that the second-best becomes
implementable. Nevertheless, P4P cannot outperform PPS when the relative marginal cost of
quality qs is low in the second best.
5.2 Third best
When consumers have provider-specic misperceptions about service benets but copayments are
uniform due to equity concern, neither the rst best nor the second best is implementable. In
Appendix A, I characterize the third best in which the social planner chooses uniform qualities
to maximize social welfare subject to consumer misperceptions. I then consider the third-best
implementation problems with the additional assumption that providers are not purely prot-
maximizing as in Section 4. I show that Propositions 3 to 5 continue to specify whether the two
provider payment systems can implement the third best or not, once adjustments similar to those
in the previous subsection are made to account for the discrepancy between marginal quality costs
and benets.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies a health service market in which explicit incentives, implicit incentives, and
market force interact as an incentive system. The main results can be summarized as a practical
guide for optimal regulation in the system. First, when consumers are rational and providers are
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prot maximizing, PPS and P4P are equivalent. Second, P4P has more exibility to address mis-
perceived consumers, and motivated but paternalistic providers, when all qualities are contractible.
Third, consumersquality preference determines whether P4P can outperform PPS or not when
one of the qualities is non-contractible. Finally, optimal provider payment mechanisms have to
be complemented by optimal copayments that are set according to the providersmarginal service
costs and consumer misperceptions. These general economic principles can be applied to healthcare
markets, as well as markets for nursing homes, childcare, social services, and education.
For tractability, I have assumed that a quality dimension is either perfectly measurable or
not measurable at all, and that the payer knows the productivity of each provider. In a bilateral
framework, Kuhn and Siciliani (2009) allow the provider to game its quality measure at the margin,
and to have private information about its productivity type. They show that when the payer
designs a pay-for-performance scheme, it can benet from pooling di¤erent productivity types, and
the resulting incentive scheme can be interpreted as a rationale for minimum quality standard.
Accommodating gaming and private information in the incentive system studied in this paper is a
fruitful direction for future research.
In the domain of healthcare, the model can potentially be extended to incorporate other policy
relevant aspects, such as income-based consumer subsidy (e.g., health insurance exchanges in the
U.S.), entry and exit of providers (e.g., Medicare Part D markets), and interactions between pri-
vate providers and a regulator who also provides services (e.g., Medicare Advantage and original
Medicare). Designing appropriate regulatory regimes to reconcile social and individual interests in
these complicated environments is of practical importance.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1: First, di¤erentiate (1) with respect to DA and set the derivative to zero yield
(2), which is interior if both providers are active. Second, the convexity of Ci in qi and ri guarantees
that (1) is concave in qi, ri. Di¤erentiate (1) with respect to qi, ri and set the derivatives to zero
yield (3) and (4), respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2: Di¤erentiate (5) with respect to i, qi, ri, and set the derivatives to zero
yield
Diy

  1
2
"
iy

  CiD(Diy; qiy; riy)
#
= 0 (30)
vq
2
"
iy

  CiD(Diy; qiy; riy)
#
= Ciq(q
i
y; r
i
y; s
i
y) (31)
vr
2
"
iy

  CiD(Diy; qiy; riy)
#
= Cir(q
i
y; r
i
y; s
i
y): (32)
By (30), iy = 2D
i
y+C
i
D(D
i
y; q
i
y; r
i
y). Substituting this into the squared-bracket term in (5), (31),
and (32) give equations (6) to (8). These equations and those in Lemma 1 are identical only if
Di = 1=2 and  = 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: See proof of Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 1: See proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 2: See proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 4: The rst best is implementable only if
1
2
+
vq(q
i   qj) + vr(ri   rj)  fCiD(Di; qi; ri)  CjD(Dj; qj; rj)g
2
=
1
2
+
feviqqi + evirrig   fevjqqj + evjrrjg   fei   ejg
2
; (33)
which is simplied to (15). Furthermore, (9) in Lemma 3 is obtained by setting evik = vk.
Proof of Proposition 3: Di¤erentiating (16) with respect to qi, ri and setting the derivatives
to zero, I obtain
eviq
2
"
iqq
i + irr
i
i
+ e	i   CiD( eDi; qi; ri)
#
+ eDi iq
i
= Ciq( eDi; qi; ri) (34)
evir
2
"
iqq
i + irr
i
i
+ e	i   CiD( eDi; qi; ri)
#
+ eDi ir
i
= Cir( eDi; qi; ri): (35)
Given ei and ej in (15), eDi = Di if both providers choose the rst-best qualities. Therefore,
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condition (34) is identical to (3), and condition (35) is identical to (4) simultaneously if and only if
1
2Di
"
iqq
i
 + 
i
rr
i

i
+ e	i   CiD(Di; qi; ri)
#
=
"
vr   ir=ievir
#
=
"
vq   iq=ieviq
#
: (36)
The last equality is necessary for rst-best implementation, and is rewritten as (17) in the propo-
sition.
Now suppose that (36) holds. The rst equality in (36) can be rearranged to (18) in the
proposition. Given the e	i in (18), (qi; ri) is the unique solution to (34) and (35). Moreover,
provider is equilibrium prot is zero if
e i =  Die	i + Ci(Di; qi; ri): (37)
Next, consider the special case in which evik = vk and iq = ir = 0. These equalities simplify
the last two squared-bracket terms in (36) to 1, and hence, the rst best is always implementable.
Moreover, (36) can be simplied to
e	i = 2Di + CiD(Di; qi; ri)
= 2
"
1
2
+
vq(q
i   qj) + vr(ri   rj)  fCiD(Di; qi; ri)  CjD(Dj; qj; rj)g
2
#
+ CiD(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
)
=  + vq(q
i
   qj) + vr(ri   rj) + CjD(qj; rj; sj);
which is the optimal prospective price in Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4: The rst-order conditions of (19) with respect to qi and ri are
eviq
2
"
iqq
i + irr
i
i
+ ei + eiqi + eiri   CiD( eDi; qi; ri)
#
+ eDi "iq
i
+ ei
#
= Ciq( eDi; qi; ri) (38)
evir
2
"
iqq
i + irr
i
i
+ ei + eiqi + eiri   CiD( eDi; qi; ri)
#
+ eDi ir
i
+ ei = Cir( eDi; qi; ri): (39)
Again, given ei and ej in (15), eDi = Di if both providers choose the rst-best qualities. Moreover,
condition (38) is identical to (3), and (39) is identical to (4) if and only if
ei + eiqi + eiri   CiD(Di; qi; ri) = 2Di vq   iq=i   eieviq   
i
i
ei + eiqi + eiri   CiD(Di; qi; ri) = 2Di vr   ir=i   eievir   
i
i
:
And provider is equilibrium prot is zero if and only if
ei + eiqi + eiri = Ci(Di; qi; ri)Di : (40)
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The three equations solve for
ei = Ci(Di; qi; ri)Di + (e"iq + e"ir)
"
Ci(Di; qi; ri)
Di
  CiD(Di; qi; ri) +
iqq
i + irri
i
#
 
"
vq  
iq
i
#
qi  

vr   
i
r
i

ri; (41)
ei satisfying (20), and ei satisfying (21). Finally, by setting evik = vk and iq = ir = 0, (20) and
(21) become (13) and (14), and (41) can be simplied to
i =
Ci(Di; qi; ri)
Di
+ ("iq + "
i
r)

Ci(Di; qi; ri)
Di
  CiD(Di; qi; ri)

  vqqi   vrri (42)
in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 5: The rst-order conditions of (22) with respect to qi, ri are
eviq
2
"
iqq
i + irr
i
i
+ bi + biqi   CiD( eDi; qi; ri)
#
+ eDi "iq
i
+ ei
#
= Ciq( eDi; qi; ri) (43)
evir
2
"
iqq
i + irr
i
i
+ bi + biqi   CiD( eDi; qi; ri)
#
+ eDi ir
i
= Cir(
eDi; qi; ri): (44)
Again, given ei and ej in Lemma 4, eDi = Di if both providers choose the rst-best qualities. In
addition, conditions (43) and (44) are, respectively, identical to (3) and (4), and provider is prot
is zero by choosing (qi; ri) if and only if
bi + biqi   CiD(Di; qi; ri) = 2Di vq   iq=i   bieviq   
i
qq
i + irri
i
bi + biqi   CiD(Di; qi; ri) = 2DiVr   ir=ievir   
i
qq
i + irri
i
bi + biqi = Ci(Di; qi; ri)  b iDi : (45)
The three equations solve for bi satisfying (23), and
bi =
"
2Di
vr   ir=ievir   
i
qq
i + irri
i
+ CiD(D
i
; q
i
; r
i
)
#
  biqi
where the squared-bracket term is the value of e	i in (18), and
b i =  Di hbi + biqii+ Ci(Di; qi; ri) =  Die	i + Ci(Di; qi; ri)
= e i in (37). Finally, it is easy to check that bi is strictly positive if and only if the left-hand side
of (17) is larger than its right-hand side.
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Third best implementations and proof of Propositions 6 to 8: In the third best, the
social planner chooses uniform qualities q and r to maximize
vqq + vrr   
"Z eDA
0
xdx+
Z 1
1  eDA(1  x)dx
#
  CA( eDA; q; r)  CB( eDB; q; r);
where eDi = 1
2
+
(eviq   evjq)q + (evir   evjr)r
2
is the misperceived consumersdemand for provider is
service when the planner has no control over consumer allocation. The third-best qualities qt and
rt are characterized by
vq  
evAq   evBq
2

(evAq   evBq )qt + (evAr   evBr )rt+ CAD(DAt ; qt; rt)  CBD(DBt ; qt; rt)	
= CAq (D
A
t ; qt; rt) + C
B
q (D
B
t ; qt; rt) (46)
vr   evAr   evBr
2

(evAq   evBq )qt + (evAr   evBr )rt+ CAD(DAt ; qt; rt)  CBD(DBt ; qt; rt)	
= CAr (D
A
t ; qt; rt) + C
B
r (D
A
t ; qt; rt); (47)
where Dit =
1
2
+
(eviq   evjq)qt + (evir   evjr)rt
2
is the third-best demand for provider is service. Consider
(46). When q increases, fevAq  evBq g=2 is the proportion of consumers who switch from provider B to
provider A due to misconceptions. The rst squared-bracket term measures the resulting change in
total transportation cost. Similarly, the second squared-bracket term measures the resulting change
in total service cost. When consumers have no misconceptions, or when consumer misconceptions
are not provider-specic, so that eviq = evjq and evir = evjr , (46) and (47) are, respectively, identical to
(24) and (25). Thus, the second best is a special case of the third best.
Under PPS, provider is maximization program is the same as (19), and hence, the rst-order
conditions are the same as (34) and (39). These two conditions are identical to (46) and (47)
simultaneously if and only if
1
2
"
iqqt + 
i
rrt
i
+ e	it   CiD(Dit; qt; rt)
#
=
1eviq
"
{Left-hand side of (46)}  Cjq (Djt ; qt; rt) 
iq
i
#
=
1evir

{Left-hand side of (47)}  Cjr (Djt ; qt; rt) 
ir
i

:
In the second best in which evik = vk and iq = ir = 0, the above expression can be simplied to
1
2
he	is   CiD(1=2; qs; rs)i = 1  Cjq (1=2; qs; rs)vq = 1  C
j
r (1=2; qs; rs)
vr
:
The last equality is rewritten as (26) in Proposition 6.
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Now consider P4P with both qualities contractible. Here, provider is maximization program is
the same as (19) and the programs rst-order conditions are the same as (38) and (39). The two
conditions, together with the zero-prot condition (40) constitute a three-equation system. Setting
the qualities in the three equations equal to qt and rt and rearranging terms yield the bonus rates
and base price that implement the third best,
eitqt =
"
Ciq(D
i
t; qt; rt)
Dit
  
i
q
i
#
qt   e"iqt
(
Ci(Dit; qt; rt)
Dit
 
"
CiD(D
i
t; qt; rt) 
iqqt + 
i
rrt
i
#)
eitrt = Cir(Dit; qt; rt)Dit   
i
r
i

rt   e"irt
(
Ci(Dit; qt; rt)
Dit
 
"
CiD(D
i
t; qt; rt) 
iqqt + 
i
rrt
i
#)
eit = Ci(Dit; qt; rt)Dit + (e"iqt + e"irt)
(
Ci(Dit; qt; rt)
Dit
 
"
CiD(D
i
t; qt; rt) 
iqqt + 
i
rrt
i
#)
 
"
Ciq(D
i
t; qt; rt)
Dit
  
i
q
i
#
qt  

Cir(D
i
t; qt; rt)
Dit
  
i
r
i

rt;
where "ikt =
evik
2
kit
Dit
. In the second best in which evik = vk and iq = ir = 0, the optimal bonus rates
and base price become (27) and (28) in Proposition 7 and
is =
Ci(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
+ (e"qs + e"rs)Ci(1=2; qs; rs)1=2   CiD(1=2; qs; rs)

 C
i
q(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
qs   C
i
r(1=2; qs; rs)
1=2
rs:
Finally, let quality r be non-contractible under P4P. In this set up, provider is maximization
program is identical to (22) and the rst-order conditions are identical to (43) and (44). At quality
levels qt and rt, the two conditions, together with the zero prot condition (45) solve for
bit =
"
Ciq(D
i
t; qt; rt)
Dit
  
i
q
i
#
  eviqevir

Cir(D
i
t; qt; rt)
Dit
  
i
r
i

bit =
"
2
Cir(D
i
t; qt; rt) Ditir(qt; rt)=ieV ir (qt; rt)   
i(qt; rt)
i
+ CiD(D
i
t; qt; rt)
#
  bitqt
b it =  Dit hbit + bitqti+ Ci(Dit; qt; rt):
In second best in which evik = vk and iq = ir = 0, these expressions become (29) in Proposition 8
and
bis = 2 Cir(1=2; qs; rs)vr + CiD(1=2; qs; rs)

  bisqs
b is =  1=2 hbis + bisqsi+ Ci(1=2; qs; rs):
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Appendix B
The comparative statics of  in the rst best
Without loss of generality, suppose that provider A is more e¢ cient, so that in the rst best
DA > 1=2. According to Theorems 5 and 6 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), the solutions,  qA ,
 rA , qB , rB , and  DA , that maximize (1) are monotone increasing in  when all the pairwise cross-
partial derivatives of  qA ,  rA , qB , rB ,  DA , and  are nonnegative. These pairwise cross-partial
derivatives are
  @
2W
@@qA
= 0   @
2W
@@rA
= 0
@2W
@@qB
= 0
@2W
@@rB
= 0   @
2W
@@DA
= (2DA   1)   @
2W
@qA@qB
= 0
@2W
@qA@rA
=  CAqr  
@2W
@qA@rB
= 0
@2W
@qA@DA
= vq   CADq
  @
2W
@qB@rA
= 0
@2W
@qB@rB
=  CBqr  
@2W
@qB@DA
= vq   CBDq
  @
2W
@rA@rB
= 0
@2W
@rA@DA
= vr   CADr  
@2W
@rB@DA
= vr   CBDr;
where the function Ci(Di; qi; ri) is rewritten as Ci to ease notation. Because DA > 1=2, the
necessary conditions for  qA ,  rA , qB , rB ,  DA to be monotone increasing in  are
 CAqr > 0,   CBqr > 0, vq   CADq > 0, vq   CBDq > 0, vr   CADr > 0, vr   CBDr > 0.
Using the same method, it can be shown that qA , rA , qB , rB , DA are monotone decreasing in
 if
 CAqr > 0,   CBqr > 0, vq   CADq > 0, vq   CBDq < 0, vr   CADr > 0, vr   CBDr < 0.
Equilibrium existence
Su¢ cient conditions for (5) to be quasi-concave and the corresponding best response
map to be a contraction: Let i denotes prot function (5), and subscripts denote partial
derivatives. i is quasi-concave if 2664
0 i
qi
i
ri
i
qi
i
qiqi
i
qiri
i
ri
i
riqi
i
riri
3775  0; (48)
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and 266664
0 i
qi
i
ri
i
i
i
qi
i
qiqi
i
qiri
i
qii
i
ri
i
riqi
i
riri
i
rii
i
i
i
iqi
i
iri
i
ii
377775  0 (49)
(Takayama, 1985, p. 123). The su¢ cient conditions in terms of  , vq, vr, and Ci are tedious but
uninformative, and omitted.
Using the same notation, the best response map of provider i satises the dominant diagonal
condition, and hence, is a contraction if
 iqiqi > iqiri +iqii +iqiqj +iqirj +iqij (50)
 iriri > iriqi +irii +iriqj +irirj +irij (51)
 iii > iiqi +iiri +iiqj +iirj +iij (52)
(Milgrom and Robert, 1990, p. 1271). These conditions guarantee that the game has a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium.
Su¢ cient conditions for the managed competition game to have a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in the subgame in Stage 2: Continue to use i to denote the
prot function of provider i. It is su¢ cient to make sure that i is quasi-concave and the best
response map of provider i is a contraction. Since i is set by the payer, i is quasi-concave as
long as condition (48) holds. Moreover, the corresponding best-response map of provider i is a
contraction if
 iqiqi > iqiri +iqiqj +iqirj (53)
 iriri > iriqi +iriqj +irirj : (54)
I assume the su¢ cient conditions hold throughout the rest of the paper.
Cost-reduction e¤ort and prospective payment system
Suppose that in addition to qualities, providers also choose cost-reduction e¤orts. To ease notation,
let quality be unidimensional and be denoted by qi. Following Hart et al. (1997), let the cost-
reduction e¤ort ei lower provider is service cost and its consumersservice benet. Both quality
and cost-reduction e¤orts generate disutilities to the providers. More specically, a consumers
benet from receiving service with quality qi and cost e¤ort ei is v(qi   ei). Provider is service
cost is Ci(Di; qi; ei), where is Ci twice di¤erentiable, CiD > 0, C
i
q > 0, C
i
e < 0, strictly positive,
and strictly convex in quality and cost e¤ort. Finally, provider is total disutility of quality and
cost e¤ort is F i(qi; ei), where F i is twice di¤erentiable, F iq > 0, F
i
e > 0, and is strictly convex.
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Observe that this specication is more general than Ma (1994), who assumes that cost-reduction
e¤ort lowers cost, but not quality.
In this specication, social welfare isZ DA
0

v(qA   eA)  x dx  CA(DA; qA; eA)  FA(qA; eA)
+
Z 1
1 DA

v(qB   eB)  (1  x) dx  CB(DB; qB; eB)  FB(qA; eA);
and the rst best is dened by
1
2
+
v(qi   qj   ei + ej)  fCiD(Di; qi; ei)  CjD(Dj; qj; ej)g
2
= Di (55)
Div = C
i
q(D
i
; q
i
; e
i
) + F
i
q(q
i
; e
i
) (56)
 Div = Cie(Di; qi; ei) + F ie(qi; ei): (57)
Let  Cie(Di; qi; ei) Div > 0, so that cost-reduction e¤ort is socially benecial in the rst best.
Under PPS, the maximization program of provider i is
max
qi;ei
"
1
2
+
v(qi   qj   ei + ej)  fi   jg
2
#
	i   Ci(Di; qi; ei)  F i(qi; ei) +  i: (58)
To implement the rst-best consumer allocation, it is necessary to set
i   j = CiD(Di; qi; ei)  CjD(Dj; qj; ej):
Next, di¤erentiating (58) with respect to qi, ei and setting the derivatives to zero, I get
v
2
[	i   CiD(Di; qi; ei)] = Ciq(Di; qi; ei) + F iq(qi; ei) (59)
  v
2
[	i   CiD(Di; qi; ei)] = Cie(Di; qi; ei) + F ie(qi; ei): (60)
Conditions (59) and (60) are, respectively, identical to (56) and (57) if and only if
Div =
v
2
[	i   CiD(Di; qi; ei)]
 Div =  
v
2
[	i   CiD(Di; qi; ei)]:
Both equations can be simplied to
	i = 2D
i
 + C
i
D(D
i
; q
i
; e
i
)
= 2
"
1
2
+
v(qi   qj   ei + ej)  fCiD(Di; qi; ei)  CjD(Dj; qj; ej)g
2
#
+ CiD(D
i
; q
i
; e
i
)
=  + vf(qi   qj)  (ei   ej)g+ CjD(qj; rj; ej):
Given this 	i and the optimal copayments, the (qi; ei) pair is the unique solution to (59) and (60),
and Di = Di. Finally, provider is equilibrium prot is F i(qi; ei) if
 i =  Di	i + Ci(Di; qi; ei):
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Monopoly model
Suppose that only provider A at location 0 is active. Since there is only one provider, I will drop
the superscript that denotes the providers identity. The social welfare isZ D
0
[vqq + vrr   x] dx  C(D; q; r):
Further suppose that it is not optimal to serve the consumer at location 1. The rst best is
characterized by
vqq + vrr   CD(D; q; r)

= D
Dvq = Cq(D; q; r)
Dvr = Cr(D; q; r)
where D < 1.
It is well understood that an unregulated single-price monopoly does not maximize social sur-
plus. Hence, consider the rst-best implementation problems as in Section 4. The rst-best con-
sumer allocation is implementable only if
evqq + evrr   e

=
vqq + vrr   CD(D; q; r)
e = CD(D; q; r) + [(evq   vq)q   (evr   vr)r]: (61)
Under PPS, the maximization program of provider A is
max
q;r
"evqq + evrr   e

# h
qq + rr + e	i  C( eD; q; r) + e ;
and the rst-order conditions areevq


qq + rr

+ e	   CD( eD; q; r)+ eDq

= Cq( eD; q; r)
evr


qq + rr

+ e	   CD( eD; q; r)+ eDr

= Cr( eD; q; r):
Given the value of e in (61), the rst best is implementable if and only if
1
D

qq + rr

+ e	   CD(D; q; r) = vr   r=evr = vq   q=evq : (62)
And if (62) is satised, the optimal e	 and e  are
e	 = Dvr   r=evr

  qq + rr


+ CD(D; q; r)
e  =  De	 + C(D; q; r):
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When q = r = 0 and evk = vk, (62) is always satised. Moreover, the consumer cost share and
prospective price become  = CD(D; q; r) and 	 = D + CD(D; q; r).
Under P4P, when both qualities are contractible, the maximization program of provider A is
max
q;r
"evqq + evrr   e

# h
qq + rr + 
ne + eq + eroi  C( eD; q; r) + e ;
and the rst-order conditions areevq


qq + rr

+ e + eq + er   CD( eD; q; r)+ eD hq + ei = Cq( eD; q; r)evr


qq + rr

+ e + eq + er   CD( eD; q; r)+ eD hr + ei = Cr( eD; q; r):
Given the value of e in (61), provider A chooses the rst-best qualities and makes zero prot in
equilibrium if and only if
e + eq + er   CD(D; q; r) = 2D vq   q=   eevq   qq + rr
e + eq + er   CD(D; q; r) = 2D vr   r=   eevr(q; r)   qq + rre + eq + er = C(D; q; r)D :
The three-equation system solves for
eq = hvq   q

i
q   e"q C(D; q; r)D  

CD(D; q; r) 
qq + rr


er = hvr   r i r   e"r

C(D; q; r)
D
 

CD(D; q; r) 
qq + rr


e = C(D; q; r)
D
+ (e"q + e"r)C(D; q; r)D  

CD(D; q; r) 
qq + rr


 
h
vq  
q

i
q  
h
vr   r

i
r;
where e"k = vk kD is again the quality elasticity of demand at k. Again, when q = r = 0 andevk = vk, the optimal bonuses become
q = vqq   "q

C(D; q; r)
D
  CD(D; q; r)

r = vrr   "r

C(D; q; r)
D
  CD(D; q; r)

:
Next, consider P4P when only quality q is contractible. Provider As maximization program is
max
q;r
"evqq + evrr   e

# h
qq + rr + 
nb + bqoi  C( eD; q; r) + b ;
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and the rst-order conditions are
evq


qq + rr

+ b + bq   CD( eD; q; r)+ eD hq

+ ei = Cq( eD; q; r)
evr


qq + rr

+ b + bq   CD( eD; q; r)+ eDr

= Cr( eD; q; r):
Given the value of e in (61), the rst best is implemented at zero provider prot if and only if
b + bq   CD(D; q; r) = D vq   q=   bevq   qq + rrb + bq   CD(D; q; r) = D vr   r=evr   qq + rrb + bq = C(D; q; r)  b 
D
:
The three equations solve for
bi = vq   q
i

  evqevr
h
vr   r

i
b = D vr   r=evr   qq + rr + CD(D; q; r)

  bq
b  =  D hb + bqi+ C(D; q; r):
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